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Adaptive Responses to Chemical Labeling: 
Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers? 
By W. KiP VISCUSI AND CHARLES J. O'CONNOR* 
A fundamental issue in the economics of 
uncertainty is how individuals process infor- 
mation and make choices under uncertainty.' 
In a recent analysis of the findings on risk 
perception, Kenneth Arrow (1982) con- 
cluded that the evidence regarding individual 
rationality was, at best, quite mixed. A prom- 
inent example of apparent irrationality of 
actual consumer behavior is that consumers, 
who presumably are risk averse, have failed 
to purchase heavily subsidized federal flood 
insurance.2 In the case of the market for 
hazardous jobs, which is the focus of this 
study, Viscusi (1979) found that workers' 
risk perceptions were positively correlated 
with the industry risk and that workers who 
perceived job risks received compensating 
wage differentials.3 Nevertheless, workers in 
high risk jobs displayed behavior consistent 
with an adaptive response in which workers 
accept jobs whose risks are not fully under- 
stood, learn about these risks based on their 
on-the-job experiences, and then quit if these 
experiences are sufficiently unfavorable given 
the wage for the job. 
Although the positive injury rate-quit rate 
linkage is consistent with an adaptive re- 
sponse, there has been no study that has 
investigated the dynamics of this relation- 
ship. Do workers learn about risks on the 
job, and does this change in perceptions lead 
workers to revise their reservation wage rates 
in the expected manner? More fundamen- 
tally, even in the absence of such learning, 
do workers have subjective risk assessments 
that generate compensating differentials in 
the manner that is consistent with studies of 
risk premiums for hazardous occupations and 
industries? In this paper we will extend this 
line of research by analyzing the nature of 
workers' risk assessments, how workers pro- 
cess information, and how changes in risk 
perceptions affect their decisions. 
Since no existing data sets provide infor- 
mation on the evolution of workers' risk 
perceptions, we undertook a sample survey 
in which we ascertained worker responses to 
labels of potentially hazardous chemicals. We 
chose this form of information because the 
chemical industry already has some experi- 
ence in conveying this information in a 
manner that workers can understand, thus 
making it possible to analyze the learning 
process rather than focusing on the design of 
the format for the information. In addition, 
this type of risk information has substantial 
policy relevance since chemical labeling is 
the major component of the OSHA hazard 
communication policy. This $3 billion policy 
was the most expensive social regulation is- 
sued during the first three years of the 
Reagan Administration.4 
* Professor and Director, Center for Study of Busi- 
ness Regulation, Fuqua School of Business, Duke Uni- 
versity, Durham, NC 27706, and consultant, Green 
Farms, CT 06436, respectively. This research was sup- 
ported in part by the Center for the Study of Business 
Regulation, Duke University. We are indebted to 
William Evans for a superb computer programming 
effort, to Henry Feng for compilation of the survey 
results, and to John Payne and seminar participants at 
several universities for helpful comments. 
'A lucid discussion of the relationship of information 
to economic behavior is provided by Kenneth Arrow 
(1974). 
2Howard Kunreuther's (1976) analysis of flood in- 
surance stresses a lack of consumer information as an 
important factor. A major theme of this study is that 
workers also are acting within a context of highly imper- 
fect information. 
3Viscusi (1979) also linked compensating differentials 
to objective risk measures, yielding comparable wage 
premiums. Other studies in the compensating differen- 
tials literature include Richard Thaler and Sherwin 
Rosen (1976), Robert Smith (1976), and Charles Brown 
(1980). Smith (1979) and Viscusi (1983) provide critical 
surveys of this literature. 
4The EPA pesticide and toxic chemical regulations 
also include chemical labeling as a policy option. See 
Susan Hadden (1983) for a review of the role of labeling 
policies of federal agencies. 
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In Section I we discuss the nature of the 
sample and present the empirical results for 
the situation before information provision to 
establish a reference point for subsequent 
results. These findings are also of interest in 
their own right because the survey provides 
extensive risk-related information that in- 
cluded detailed risk-assessment questions and 
information on whether workers would re- 
peat their job choice. These data will conse- 
quently enable us to make a more direct link 
than in previous research between workers' 
risk perceptions and labor market outcomes, 
such as compensating differentials for risk. 
The effect of the chemical labels on workers' 
risk perceptions is the subject of Section II. 
We estimate both the risk level implied by 
the hazard warning and the informational 
content relative to the worker's prior beliefs. 
This evidence is consistent with a Bayesian 
learning process in which workers retain some 
influence of their priors and incorporate the 
new information in the expected manner. 
Section III's analysis of the effect of risk 
information on compensating differentials 
and worker turnover provides the first ex- 
plicit test of the effect of changes in workers' 
risk perceptions on labor market perfor- 
mance. 
The overall picture that emerges is that 
workers begin jobs with imperfect informa- 
tion, but there are many rational elements to 
worker behavior, and the extent of risk- 
related mismatches of jobs and workers is 
not rampant. After acquiring risk informa- 
tion, most workers display the capacity to 
update their probabilistic beliefs in a manner 
that is broadly consistent with Bayesian 
analysis. The adaptive responses that emerge 
suggest that workers are engaged in an on- 
going experimentation process in which they 
learn about the risks posed by their job and 
quit once the position becomes sufficiently 
unattractive. 
I. The Sample and Baseline Results 
Since no existing body of data provides 
longitudinal information on workers' risk 
perceptions, we developed a survey to enable 
us to analyze worker responses to job hazard 
information. The focus of this section is on 
the nature of the sample and the empirical 
results for the situation before workers re- 
ceived risk information. Because of the more 
comprehensive nature of the risk questions, 
it is possible to broaden the empirical sup- 
port for the principal labor market impacts 
of employment hazards. 
The sample consisted of 335 employees in 
the chemical industry. During the first six 
months of 1982, the managers responsible 
for chemical labeling interviewed workers at 
four plant locations of three major chemical 
firms. The operations represented included 
research and development as well as manu- 
facturing. The sample included a broad range 
of occupational groups exposed to chem- 
icals. Engineers, technicians, chemists, me- 
chanics, researchers, and supervisors were all 
included. Over half of the sample-187 
workers-consisted of workers who were 
either on hourly pay or were technicians. 
This group, which we will denote by BC/ 
TECH, closely parallels the blue-collar sub- 
sample analyzed in Viscusi (1979) and will 
be the focus of much of the empirical work 
in this section. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample character- 
istics for the full sample and the BC/TECH 
subsample. The sample characteristics follow 
the pattern one would expect for a national 
chemical firm. The average worker age is 39, 
and the majority of all workers are white 
males (only 7 percent blacks and 43 percent 
females). The individuals averaged two years 
of college education, or years of schooling 
(EDUC) equal to 14. Almost two-thirds of 
the sample were married with an average of 
1.36 children (KIDS). Their total work expe- 
rience (EXPER) was 18 years, 8 of which 
were at the particular firm (TENURE). The 
average annual earnings (EARNG) was over 
$21,000. 
The most distinctive characteristic of the 
sample was the inclusion of a series of risk 
perception questions. The DANGER vari- 
able pertains to whether or not the worker's 
job exposes him to dangerous or unhealthy 
conditions. The wording of this question 
parallels that in the University of Michigan 
Survey of Working Conditions (1975) used by 
Viscusi (1979) and will be used in assessing 
the comparability of the empirical results. In 
that study, 52 percent of the blue-collar 
workers viewed their jobs as dangerous. The 
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TABLE 1-SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Variable Full Sample BC/TECH Subsample 
AGE (in years) 38.8 38.9 
(11.8) (12.8) 
BLACK (0-1 race dummy variable (dv))a 0.07 0.10 
MALE (0-1 sex dv)a 0.57 0.42 
EDUC (years of schooling) 14.44 12.47 
(3.21) (2.05) 
MARRIED (0-1 marital dv)a 0.64 0.62 
KIDS (number of children) 1.36 1.10 
(1.52) (1.28) 
EXPER (years of work experience) 18.38 19.19 
(11.68) (13.0) 
TENURE (years of experience at firm) 8.19 7.15 
(7.22) (6.41) 
EARNG (annual earnings) $21,120.4 $15,768.6 
($8,332.1) ($3,596.6) 
DANGER (0-1 risk dv )a .57 0.50 
RISK (scaled risk) 0.10 0.09 
(0.06) (0.07) 
HRISK (0-1 high risk dv)a 0.36 0.35 
WPREM (0-1 perceived wage premium dv) 0.11 0.10 
TAKEA (0-1 repeat job choice dv)a 0.79 0.77 
TAKEB (0-1 repeat job choice dv)a 0.97 0.96 
QUITA (0-1 quit intention dv) 0.12 0.12 
QUITB (0-1 quit intention dv) 0.05 0.05 
Sample Size 335 185 
aStandard deviations for 0-1 dummy variables are omitted since they can be 
calculated from their fraction m in the sample, where the standard deviation is 
(m - mr2)5. 
results here are quite similar, as 57 percent of 
the overall sample viewed their jobs as 
dangerous, with 50 percent of the BC/TECH 
subsample perceiving some risk. 
Although the mean DANGER levels are 
not unexpected, the relative riskiness rank- 
ings are the opposite of what one might 
expect since the BC/TECH group presum- 
ably faces greater risks. Whether or not this 
is actually the case is not clearcut since the 
white-collar research chemists may in fact 
incur greater health risks than, for example, 
maintenance personnel. The more similar re- 
sults for the continuous RISK variable dis- 
cussed below suggest, however, that these 
results may not stem from an actual differ- 
ence in riskiness. Rather, the BC/TECH 
workers may have a less stringent risk level 
cutoff for considering whether their jobs are 
hazardous. Since willingness to accept a risk 
is negatively related to one's wealth, it is not 
unexpected that higher-income workers are 
more likely to regard a job as dangerous, for 
any given risk level.5 
Except in the case of one study using the 
DANGER variable, all previous analyses of 
risk premiums have used objective occupa- 
tional or industry risk measures. For this 
paper we developed a variable that would 
reflect the worker's subjective assessment of 
the BLS injury and illness frequency rate for 
his job. From the standpoint of the theoreti- 
cal foundations of the compensating differ- 
ential theory, the wage-risk relationship 
should be driven by such subjective risk per- 
ceptions. Aggregative risk variables simply 
serve as an objective proxy for this variable. 
To overcome the difficulties arising from 
different danger reference points and to pro- 
vide a continuous risk measure that will make 
5Educational differences and related differences in 
ability to perceive risks may also play a role. 
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possible a detailed analysis of worker learn- 
ing, we developed a continuous RISK vari- 
able. We presented to each worker a linear 
scale, ranging from very safe to dangerous. 
To provide an objective reference point, an 
arrow marked the average U.S. private sector 
injury and illness rate. Each respondent 
marked on the scale the risk level that he 
assessed for his job. This variable was then 
converted into probabilistic terms, that is, 
scaled between 0 and 1, where risk is on a 
scale comparable to the BLS annual injury 
frequency rate. The mean RISK levels for 
the full sample and the BC/TECH subsam- 
ple are comparable to the national average 
private sector risk probabilities and about 50 
percent larger than the recent levels of the 
chemical industry's injury and illness fre- 
quency rate. This discrepancy is not unex- 
pected since BLS statistics primarily capture 
safety-related accidents and underreport the 
long-term illnesses from chemical exposures; 
reported injury rates will understate the ac- 
tual risk level. 
Using the RISK responses, we also created 
a job hazard dummy variable similar to 
DANGER except that the risk threshold 
reference point was the same for all respon- 
dents. The high-risk variable HRISK as- 
sumed a value of 1 if the worker faced a risk 
above the U.S. average, and 0 otherwise. A 
third of the sample viewed their jobs as being 
high risk, and two-thirds viewed their jobs as 
being comparatively safe. In conjunction with 
the earlier RISK results, these findings sug- 
gest that the chemical industry's relatively 
good accident record may be a reasonable 
reflection of most workers' perceptions, but 
the presence of substantial health risks leads 
a sizable minority to consider their jobs par- 
ticularly hazardous. 
Since the time of Adam Smith, economists 
have observed that perceived risks will gener- 
ate compensating wage differentials since 
workers will demand extra compensation for 
jobs that pose extra risk.6 Table 2 sum- 
marizes the risk variable results for equations 
in which annual earnings (EARNG) and its 
natural logarithm (LNEARNG) serve as the 
dependent variables. Each equation also in- 
cluded an extensive group of variables that 
typically enter such earnings equations, such 
as the individual's education and work expe- 
rience. For the BC/TECH subsample, the 
annual risk premium of $700-$800 for 
DANGER was of roughly the same magni- 
tude as the $900 annual compensation found 
for the blue-collar subsample in Viscusi 
(1979) for both DANGER and the BLS in- 
jury rate. 
As with that study, the full sample results 
were not successful because of an inability to 
disentangle the wage premiums for risk from 
the positive overall relationship between job 
quality and individual income. The change in 
earnings equations in Section III will not be 
subject to this difficulty. Restricting the sam- 
ple to males only eliminates some of the 
problems arising from failing to control ade- 
quately for the omitted variables that de- 
termine individual earnings. Male workers' 
jobs tend to involve more direct handling of 
chemicals, and the annual risk premiums are 
considerably larger than for the BC/TECH 
subsample. 
Of the three risk variables, DANGER 
yielded the largest annual risk premiums. 
These were somewhat larger than those for 
RISK, which were about $100 less. The 
above-average risk variable HRISK led to 
the smallest annual risk premiums, but the 
effects were consistently positive and statisti- 
cally significant (at the 5 percent level, one- 
tailed test). This pattern may reflect the 
shortcomings of the HRISK variable, which 
may be a less accurate measure of the un- 
derlying job risk, thus leading to a down- 
ward bias in its coefficient. The general 
implications of these findings are less am- 
biguous. The consistently significant results 
using the subjective risk variables and the 
similarity in the DANGER and RISK pre- 
miums to those in earlier studies should bol- 
ster one's confidence in the validity of the 
compensating differential theory. 
A closely related issue is whether workers 
are aware of any risk premiums. Since no 
previous study had asked workers whether 
they believed that they received a risk pre- 
mium, we developed a variable WPREM that 
6See fn. 3 above for a list of several previous risk 
premium studies. 
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TABLE 2-SUMMARY OF COMPENSATING DIFFERENTIAL RESULTSa 
Dependent Risk Average Annual 
Variable Sample Variable Risk Coefficient Risk Premium 
EA RNG BC/TECH DANGER 1577.2 $788.6 
(438.1) 
LNEARNG BC/TECH DANGER 0.097 $746.5 
(0.029) 
EARNG BC/TECH RISK 6898.4 $636.2 
(3461.1) 
LNEARNG BC/TECH RISK 0.479 $665.3 
(0.231) 
EARNG BC/TECH HRISK 738.4 $258.4 
(465.5) 
LNEARNG BC/TECH HRISK 0.053 $289.8 
(0.031) 
EARNG Full (males) DANGER 2117.5 $1385.7 
(775.6) 
LNEARNG Full (males) DANGER 0.124 $1875.3 
(0.036) 
EARNG Full (males) WPREM 1583.1 b 
(1179.9) 
LNEARNG Full (males) WPREM .1094 $278.8 
(.0549) 
EA RNG Full DANGER 169.03 b 
(529.51) 
LNEARNG Full DANGER 0.018 b 
(0.025) 
aEach equation also includes the following variables: AGE, BLACK, MALE, EDUC, MARRIED, KIDS, and 
EXPER. The full sample results also include a BC/TECH dummy variable. The standard errors are shown in 
parentheses below the coefficients. 
bAnnual risk premiums are not reported since the coefficients are not statistically significant (at the 5 percent level, 
one-tailed test). 
assumed value of 1 if the worker believed 
that he received higher pay because of the 
nature of the chemical industry and 0 
otherwise. This variable reflects compensat- 
ing differentials for working in the chemical 
industry as opposed to some other industry, 
not risk premiums per se. Since two-thirds of 
the sample regarded their jobs as safer than 
the U.S. average, these incremental pre- 
miums should not be large. Only 10 percent 
of the sample believed they received such a 
chemical industry premium, and those that 
did eamed an average wage premium of un- 
der $300, controlling for other factors (see 
LNEARNG equation, Table 2). As expected, 
the probability that the worker perceives a 
risk premium is strongly and positively re- 
lated to each of the three risk variables, as 
the logit results in Table 3 indicate. 
Since over one-third of the sample be- 
lieved that they faced above-average risks 
and only one-tenth acknowledge the ex- 
istence of relative wage premiums, roughly 
one-quarter of the sample might appear to 
behave in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the standard theory. This need not be the 
case since workers may, for example, earn 
some form of economic rent that makes the 
job attractive despite the absence of a per- 
ceived relative risk premium. Moreover, since 
the overall risk premiums average under 
$1,000 annually and only $300 for the rela- 
tive chemical industry differential, many re- 
spondents may not have believed that the 
risk premium they received was sufficiently 
large to make the chemical industry salary 
substantially different from what could be 
earned elsewhere. 
Some portion of this group who perceive 
risks but not relative risk premiums may, 
however, be mismatched. On a conceptual 
basis, there clearly is some potential for some 
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TABLE 3-MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR 
PERCEIVED RISK PREMIUM AND TURNOVER EQUATIONa 
Dependent Risk 
Variable Variable Coefficientb 
WPREM DANGER 2.96 
(0.75) 
WPREM RISK 6.89 
(2.78) 
WPREM HRISK 0.54 
(0.38) 
TAKEA DANGER -1.42 
(0.35) 
TAKEA RISK -11.22 
(2.32) 
TA KEA HRISK -1.53 
(0.30) 
QUITA DANGER 1.21 
(0.48) 
QUITA RISK 6.95 
(2.86) 
QUITA HRISK 1.55 
(0.42) 
a Other variables entered in each equation include: 
AGE, BLACK, MALE, EDUC, MARRIED, KIDS, 
EXPER (in WPREM equations), TENURE (in all ex- 
cept WPREM equations), and EARNG (in all except 
WPREM equations). 
bAsymptotic standard errors are shown in paren- 
theses. 
labor market mismatches even with rational 
behavior if workers have some imperfect 
knowledge of the risks of the job which they 
continually update as they acquire additional 
information through their on-the-job experi- 
ence.7 Wage premiums for risk will be ob- 
served, but workers in high-risk situations 
will also tend to quit once they have learned 
about the risks and have decided that the 
risk compensation is insufficient. Although 
past empirical work has focused`on worker 
quitting,8 a related prediction is that if 
workers were asked to repeat their job choice 
based on current information, many workers 
in high-risk jobs would be reluctant to do so. 
Unlike worker quitting, this job acceptance 
question is not influenced by transactions 
costs of job changes, such as seniority rights. 
This question also avoids the limitations of 
the relative risk premium question, which 
may not fully capture the overall desirability 
of the job. 
For the full sample, 79 percent of the 
sample would decide without hesitation to 
take the same job (TAKEA). The remaining 
21 percent would either have some second 
thoughts or would definitely not take the job. 
Since 97 percent of all respondents would, 
at most, "have some second thoughts" 
(TAKEB), only 3 percent of the sample ap- 
pears to have strong reservations about their 
positions. The combination of the wage pre- 
mium estimates and the widespread willing- 
ness to repeat the employment decision sug- 
gests that job risks are not a major source of 
worker dissatisfaction. Few workers appear 
to be seriously mismatched. 
One mechanism by which mismatches are 
remedied is through worker quitting. To 
analyze the job hazard-quit relationship, we 
developed quit intention variables utilizing 
the same phrasing as did the Survey of Work- 
ing Conditions questions analyzed in Viscusi 
(1979). As shown in that study, this quit 
intention measure yielded results that were 
quite similar to those generated by actual 
quit behavior. One-eighth of the sample was 
very likely or somewhat likely to "make a 
genuine effort to find a new job with another 
employer within the next year" (QUITA), 
but only 5 percent were very likely to do so 
(QUITB). Some worker dissatisfaction is 
clearly present, but there is not a large pro- 
portion of severely dissatisfied workers at the 
firms in our sample. 
The worker's job risk plays an instrumen- 
tal role in the cases in which mismatches are 
observed. Table 3 presents the maximum 
likelihood estimates for the determinants of 
two job satisfaction measures. In each case, 
the equations also included a series of vari- 
ables, such as worker age, that are strongly 
linked to worker turnover. The probability 
that the worker would repeat this job de- 
cision (TAKEA) is negatively related to 
all perceived risk variables, controlling for 
7See Viscusi (1979) for a formal presentation of this 
model. 
8The job hazard-quit results in Viscusi (1979) are 
presented for aggregative quit rates, three national sam- 
ples of panel quit data (Panel Study of Income Dy- 
namics and two National Longitudinal Surveys), and 
quit intention data from the Survey of Working Condi- 
tions. 
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worker earnings and other related factors. A 
worker who views his job as dangerous 
(DANGER), for example, will have a proba- 
bility of repeating his initial job choice that 
is .22 lower than those who do not. Similarly, 
all of the job risk variables exert a positive 
influence on QUITA, where the quit inten- 
tion probability will increase from .06 to .19 
-or over triple- if the worker views his job 
as dangerous. Put somewhat differently, the 
mean effect of the DANGER variable ac- 
counts for one-half of all quit intentions. 
These results are consistent with a model 
in which the worker's job choice among 
potentially hazardous jobs is part of an 
ongoing adaptive process. Workers' reserva- 
tion wages will increase as their perceived 
risks rise so that we will observe risk pre- 
miums for prior perceived risks and for some 
risks discovered on the job. Risk that workers 
learn about but for which they are not com- 
pensated sufficiently will generate quits. 
While the evidence is consistent with this 
general view, the intermediate learning link- 
age and the behavioral implications of 
changes in risk assessments have not yet 
been examined. 
II. Hazard Information and Risk Perceptions 
To obtain evidence on this learning pro- 
cess, we carried out the following risk infor- 
mation processing experiment in the second 
part of the questionnaire. We presented each 
worker with a hazard warning label for one 
chemical that was not a current part of his 
job. Each respondent was told that he would 
use 100 lb. containers of this substance within 
the context of his current job operations, but 
that this chemical would replace the chemi- 
cals with which the individual was currently 
working. The scenario was similar to that in 
which a worker learns that the chemicals he 
uses have been mislabelled. We provided 
workers with "new information" rather than 
informing them of existing hazards so as to 
be able to distinguish the role of the hazard 
warning from a priori knowledge about the 
job, thus providing a context in which learn- 
ing could be observed. We then asked each 
worker how this change would affect his risk 
perception and other aspects of his behavior. 
Subsequent changes in risk perceptions con- 
sequently do not reflect an inadequacy in 
workers' prior judgments, but rather how 
information regarding a newly introduced 
risk will alter the assessment of the job's 
imp.lcations. 
We assigned workers to one of four differ- 
ent labeling groups: sodium bicarbonate 
(CARB), a lachrymator chloroacetophenone 
(LAC), asbestos (ASB), and TNT. The 
CARB control group was set at a relatively 
smaller size since the primary focus was on 
the implications of the three risky sub- 
stances. Each of these workers was given the 
information following a standard chemical 
labeling format. Representative portions of 
each label are given below: 
SODIUM BICARBONATE. SPILL: 
Sweep-up, place in an appropriate 
chemical waste container... 
CHLOROACETOPHENONE. 
WARNING! LACHRYMATOR- 
VAPOR AND DUST EXTREMELY 
IRRITATING. Do not breathe dust or 
vapor. Wear a self-contained breathing 
apparatus... 
ASBESTOS. DANGER! CANCER 
HAZARD. Use with a NIOSH-Mesa 
approved respirator. Use with ap- 
proved goggles... 
TNT-(blend of dry Trinitro- 
toluene). DANGER! HIGH EXPLO- 
SIVES. MUST BE STORED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS. KEEP IN COOL, 
DRY, WELL VENTILATED, LOCK- 
UP AREA... 
Workers did not proceed with the rest of 
the questionnaire until they had been able to 
answer successfully some basic overall ques- 
tions to test whether they had read the label. 
The workers appeared to have little difficulty 
in this regard since they had substantial 
experience using chemicals labeled in this 
manner. Although the information provided 
was not with respect to a specific risk level 
but for a chemical hazard for which risk 
assessments will vary, the responses were 
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TABLE 4-VARIABLE MEANS FOR EACH LABELING GROUP 
Means of Variables with Alternative Labels 
Risk Variable CARB LAC ASB TNT 
RISK .12 .10 .09 .10 
RISK] .06 .18 .26 .31 
HRISK .42 .38 .29 .40 
HRISKJ .07 .83 .95 .98 
WBOOST .03 .48 .71 .82 
Risk Premiuma 0 $1,919.01 $2,995.59 $5,158.31 
NO WA GE 0 .02 .11 .17 
QUITA .23 .10 .13 .10 
QUITA1 .00 .23 .65 .73 
TA KEA .67 .82 .80 .76 
TA KEA 1 .90 .58 .11 .07 
Sample Size 31 106 102 96 
aRisk premium is YJ - Y. The figures are conditional upon facing an increased risk 
and being willing to accept a finite risk premium. 
consistent with the general patterns one might 
expect. Table 4 summarizes the variable 
means for each labeling group. 
Before analyzing the principal economic 
implications of the learning process, we will 
first review the general pattern of the 
responses and their plausibility. Sodium bi- 
carbonate is a very safe substance, and this 
label leads to a reduction in the RISK vari- 
able from .12 to .6 for RISK], where the 
postscript I indicates the post-information 
analogue of the variable. Besides halving the 
assessed RISK level, CARB also dramati- 
cally reduced the fraction of workers who 
believe they face above-average risk. Only 
one respondent raised his RISK assessment 
(from .05 to .06), but since this worker was 
in a very low-risk job and had a posterior 
RISK] value identical to the CARB subsam- 
ple mean, this behavior cannot be regarded 
as irrational. 
If CARB were the only risk posed by the 
worker's job, one would expect that the 
workers would assess this risk as being zero. 
Even when working with a safe sjibstance, 
there is, however, a residual risk such as the 
risk of a safety-related job injury from acci- 
dents. Since the RISK] value of .06 for 
CARB equals the 1980 and 1981 average 
BLS injury rate for the chemical industry, 
the results are not out of line with what one 
might expect once the chemical hazards have 
been eliminated. In addition, not all workers 
may have known what sodium bicarbonate 
is. The label suggests that it is a very safe 
chemical, but it does not explicitly state that 
it is risk free. 
The lachrymator was the second safest 
substance in the labeling group. Workers 
viewed this chemical as more hazardous than 
their present environment, as the RISK level 
almost doubled, and the fraction of workers 
who considered themselves in above-average 
risk jobs increased by .45. Eleven workers 
did not revise their risk assessments upward 
after seeing the LAC label, but these workers 
were in very high-risk jobs; their RISK level 
decreased from .19 to .15, which is still above 
the average pre-information RISK value for 
the sample. Notwithstanding the absence of 
any assessed increase in risk for this sub- 
group, one person indicated that he was 
somewhat likely to look for a new job 
(QUITAI ) even though he had not expressed 
this intention earlier, producing a minor con- 
sistency problem. 
The asbestos warning led to a more 
dramatic response. The riskiness of this sub- 
stance relative to TNT is not clearcut be- 
cause of the deferred nature of asbestos-re- 
lated cancers. Asbestos is, however, a very 
potent carcinogen, and it led workers to tri- 
ple their assessed RISK levels, with almost 
all workers viewing their jobs as above aver- 
age in riskiness. Somewhat surprisingly, 5 
percent of all workers did not view ASB jobs 
as posing above-average risk. Moreover, a 
substantial group of 26 workers, most of 
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whom were in very high-risk jobs, did not 
raise their risk perceptions. The unresponsive 
group's reservation wage and quit responses 
(for example, no increase in quits and 
elimination of all QUITA =1 values) were 
consistent with their RISK] values, so that 
the RISK] variable appears to reflect a more 
favorable assessment of the job's attractive- 
ness. Such a favorable response is not im- 
plausible, particularly for researchers who 
work with new unregulated carcinogens on a 
daily basis. 
The explosive hazards of TNT generated 
the greatest risk assessment response, as all 
but two workers now viewed their jobs as 
above average in risk. Although 11 workers 
did not raise their RISK assessments in re- 
sponse to the warning, these workers were on 
very hazardous jobs (RISK equal to .19), 
and on average the TNT warning lowered 
their RISK value by only .04. There was, 
however, one seemingly inconsistent respon- 
dent who indicated that he was somewhat 
likely to quit (QUITAI) even though he 
hadn't been earlier, and his assessed RISK 
level had not increased. 
As with the earlier results, there is a 
widespread response to information in the 
expected direction. The behavior of only a 
small minority of the workers does not ap- 
pear consistent with a rational learning pro- 
cess. This result does not, however, imply 
that workers respond perfectly to new infor- 
mation since the relation between the four 
labels and actual risk levels is not narrowly 
defined. Some imprecision is inherent be- 
cause of differences in individual susceptibil- 
ity to risk. 
To test the empirical implications of the 
hazard warnings more fully, we will formal- 
ize the nature of the learning process. The 
assumption here is that workers adopt a 
Bayesian learning approach where their as- 
sessed probabilities belong to the beta family. 
This distribution is ideally suited to analyz- 
ing independent Bernoulli trials on events 
such as whether or not one suffers a job 
accident.9 We will view the receipt of the 
new labeling information as equivalent to 
observing additional Bernoulli trials concern- 
ing the riskiness of the job. The implicit 
assumption is consequently that labels sim- 
ply serve to augment the risk information 
available to workers.'0 
The two parameters of the prior distribu- 
tion are p, the assessed prior probability of 
an adverse outcome (i.e., RISK), and y, a 
term that can be regarded as the precision of 
the prior. After observing m unsuccessful 
outcomes (for example, accidents) and n suc- 
cessful outcomes, the posterior accident 
probability (yp + m)/(y + m + n). The term 
y is tantamount to the number of trials the 
worker acts as if he has experienced when 
forming his prior. 
The informational content of each label i 
likewise depends on two parameters: {i, the 
precision of the information (i.e., the equiva- 
lent number of observations m + n reflected 
in the information) and si, the fraction of 
these observations that are unfavorable. 
Whether or not the label raises workers' 
probability assessments depends on whether 
Si exceeds p, and the extent of revision is 
positively related to the informational con- 
tent (i, for any given value of si. If workers 
are provided with perfect information and if 
the labeled chemical is the only risk, the 
value of {i should be infinite. The labels do 
not specify the exact chemical risk, so that (i 
need not be infinite in practice. Moreover, 
the label only conveys information regarding 
the risks from direct chemical use so that all 
accident-related risks and all environmental 
chemical risks remain. Worker responses 
consequently will reflect the relative weights 
workers placed on the prior and posterior 
information, where these weights will capture 
both the degree to which the information in 
the label was credible and the relative role of 
this risk in the new version of the worker's 
job. 
9See John Pratt, Howard Raiffa, and Robert Schlaifer 
(1975) for more detailed advocacy of the use of beta 
distributions for Bernoulli processes. 
10If workers do not in fact treat the label as equiva- 
lent to additional job experiences but rather "forget" 
their earlier knowledge, no difficulties are caused pro- 
vided that the degree of forgetting is determined by the 
precision of their judgments, not the level of the risk. If 
the initial risk level were also to affect the weight placed 
on the label, the empirical estimates would be biased. 
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The posterior probability pi of an adverse 
job outcome after receiving a hazard warning 
for chemical i is given by 
_ Yp + 
~isi is + yp (1) Pi- 
=y + j y+ 
The regression equation counterpart of 
equation (1) for each chemical i is 
RISKJi = ai + /iRISKi + ui, 
where ui is a random error term and 
(2) ai= y /+ pi 3 y+ 
To take into account the bounded nature of 
the dependent variable, we will also estimate 
the equations in terms of the log-odds of the 
probability, or ln(RISK/(I - RISK)). In 
this case, the parameters ai and fPi for the 
linear regression counterpart can be derived 
from the regression results but are not pro- 
duced as directly. 
The estimated versions of the parameters 
in equation (2) also can be used to construct 
two key measures of the information con- 
veyed by the warning. The risk level si is 
given by 
(3) Si a?il(ai -1), 
which can be verified using equation (2). 
Similarly, the informational content of the 
warning relative to the prior, %i, is given by 
(4) *i = (/Y 
Higher values of 'i imply greater infor- 
mativeness of the label compared to the 
worker's initial judgments. 
To the extent that workers' risk responses 
reflect not only changes in the probability of 
an adverse outcome but also changes in their 
severity, one must modify the formulas 
above. Let Vi be the severity (i.e., monetary 
equivalent) of the health impact posed by the 
hazard warning relative to that posed by the 
average U.S. job injury, which serves as the 
metric for the analysis. If the RISK] re- 
sponses reflect changes both in the probabil- 
ity of an accident and its severity, equation 
(3) becomes 
(5) siVi ai/( -1), 
and the formulation and interpretation of 
equation (4) remains unaltered." Although 
the discussion below will be in probabilistic 
terms and will not include Vi explicitly, it 
should be noted that these risks are severity 
weighted. 
Table 5 summarizes the regression results 
and the parameters calculated from them. 
Overall, the linear variant of the equation 
provided a better fit than the log-odds for- 
mulation. The coefficients ai and /Pi reflect 
the nature of the learning process. In the 
case in which workers' judgments are not 
affected by the hazard warning and are solely 
dependent on their prior value of RISK, ai 
will equal 0 and fPi will equal 1. At the other 
extreme in which the hazard information is 
dominant, fPi will equal 0 and ai will be 
positive. The regression results were between 
these two extremes. In all cases the label 
provided a substantial input, and in two 
cases the prior continued to play a significant 
role. These results are broadly consistent with 
a Bayesian learning model. 
In the case of CARB, the label lowered the 
RISK assessment but did not eliminate the 
role of the prior, as both ai and /Pi were 
statistically significant in the linear case 
where the relation to equation (2) is direct. 
The risk level s1 implied by CARB is .04, or 
under half of the worker's prior RISK level, 
and I, implies that the relative precision of 
" More specifically, let VO be the original accident 
severity and Vi be the severity of the postwarning 
accident. Suppose that the components of RISK] repre- 
sent a weighted average of these risks and that they take 
the form 
RISK] =YP/( Y + ()) Vo + (O/Y + () Vi 
If we set VO equal to 1 (no loss of generality), the values 
of ai and P3i are given by 
aj=t siV,/(y+tj and fi=y/(y+,). 
The severity-weighted results in the text follow directly. 
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TABLE 5-RISK PERCEPTION AFTER INFORMATION REGRESSION RESULTS 
CA RB LA C ASB TNT 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Constant 0.030 - 3.58 0.14 -2.05 0.25 -1.23 0.31 - 0.86 
(0.014) (0.46) (0.01) (0.13) (0.02) (0.11) (0.02) (0.09) 
RISK 0.21 3.23 0.44 3.76 0.14 1.36 0.03 0.11 
(0.10) (3.56) (0.10) (1.12) (0.14) (1.03) (0.13) (0.76) 
R 2 .12 .03 .14 .10 .08 .02 .01 .01 
si .038 .042 .239 .274 .289 .325 .317 .315 
*i 3.72 4.98 1.29 0.83 6.43 2.80 31.36 40.67 
Note: All cols. (1) are RISK] (linear); all cols. (2) are RISK] (log-odds). 
the hazard warning was 4-5 times that of the 
prior. 
Since the very safe properties of sodium 
bicarbonate are reasonably well known, one 
might have expected that CARB would re- 
sult in a larger relative precision estimate 
and a lower s1 than was observed. A possible 
explanation is that workers did not place an 
infinite weight on a chemical exposure with 
near zero risk because of the residual risks of 
the job. These workers will continue to be 
exposed to a variety of airborne carcinogens 
and safety-related risks that will be reflected 
in the posterior RISK] values. As the risks 
captured by the label approach zero, the 
nonzero risk components of the worker's job 
become more instrumental since they dom- 
inate the role of the label. 
The CARB label was, however, much more 
powerful than the LAC warning. This label 
led to the greatest retention of workers' prior 
beliefs, as the RISK coefficients are the 
largest of any of the regressions. A small 
impact was not a consequence of any close 
similarity in the hazard probabilities of LAC 
and RISK, since s2 is over double the prior 
value of RISK. The limited nature of the 
effect derives from the lower relative preci- 
sion '2 of this warning, which had roughly 
the same informational content as did 
workers' prior beliefs. 
Warnings for the severe risks of ASB and 
TNT are so powerful that the prior RISK 
variable plays an insignificant role; only the 
constant terms enter. The risk levels s3 and 
s4 are somewhat higher than for LAC, but 
the major difference is the precision of the 
information. Asbestos warnings have roughly 
the same relative precision as LA C, but TNT 
has especially large informational content, 
roughly 30-40 times that of the prior. Since 
TNT poses well known explosive risks, this 
result is not unexpected. 
Overall, the risk levels si implied by LAC, 
ASB, and TNT were not too dissimilar. The 
greatest difference was the relative precision 
associated with these warnings. The impact 
of a hazard warning does not hinge solely on 
the implied risk level. In this instance, the 
informational content of the label proved to 
be more instrumental in altering workers' 
probabilistic judgments. To be effective, haz- 
ard warnings must convey information in a 
convincing manner. Otherwise, the weight 
individuals place on their prior beliefs will 
dominate in the formation of workers' risk 
judgments. 
III. The Effect of Learning on Worker Behavior 
The change in the risk perceptions result- 
ing from the hazard warnings in turn will 
affect worker behavior if workers make 
sequential decisions in an optimal manner. 
The data in the bottom portion of Table 4 
summarize the wage and turnover effects, 
which reflect similar patterns of influence. 
After reviewing the general nature of these 
responses, we will use these responses to test 
the key hypotheses regarding rational worker 
behavior. 
The demand for risk premiums is posi- 
tively related to the change in the risk, as one 
would expect. The fraction of workers who 
indicate that they would require a higher 
salary to be willing to work with the new 
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chemical (WBOOST) is about three-fourths 
for ASB and TNT. As noted above, there are 
some workers with very high initial risk as- 
sessments that were not increased as a result 
of the label so that not all workers will desire 
extra compensation. The amount of extra 
compensation demanded ranges from $2,000 
for LAC to over $5,000 for TNT. Workers 
need no risk premium to work with CARB. 
(Indeed, they should be willing to take a pay 
cut, but the survey did not address this possi- 
bility.) The premium estimates are only for 
those workers willing to remain on the job in 
return for extra pay. Some workers, particu- 
larly for TNT and ASB, were not willing 
to state an acceptable reservation wage 
( NO WA GE). Whether these 29 nonrespon- 
dents were unwilling to accept any finite risk 
premium or simply believed that no ade- 
quate risk premium was feasible is unclear. 
The effect on worker turnover was particu- 
larly dramatic since the experiment altered 
the risk but did not alter the wage rate. 
These risks consequently will produce a more 
dramatic worker response than in a market 
context where there would be some adjust- 
ment in the wage level. The QUITA] and 
TAKEA1 questions pertained to the at- 
tractiveness of the current job, varying only 
the risk. In the case of CARB, there was a 23 
percent drop in quit intentions to zero, and 
an equal increase in the percentage of workers 
who would repeat their job choice. The 
lachrymator produced a 13 percent increase 
in quit intentions and a 24 percent drop in 
workers willing to repeat their job choice. 
The strongest effects were for ASB and TNT, 
which would lead the majority of workers to 
quit and almost all workers to be unwilling 
to repeat their job choice. 
An instructive check on the validity of 
these responses is to analyze whether the 
behavioral relationship governing. the risk 
premium and quit decisions parallel those in 
the pre-information situation. Such an analy- 
sis will also make possible an explicit test of 
the impact of the risk si implied by the label 
and its relative precision *i. Higher implied 
risks si clearly should make the job less 
attractive. The relative precision of one's risk 
assessment will also increase workers' re- 
servation wage since, as shown in Viscusi 
(1979), the value of a risky job is negatively 
related to the precision of one's risk judg- 
ments. Jobs associated with looser prob- 
abilistic judgments are more attractive since 
they offer greater potential gains from ex- 
perimentation. Workers can terminate uncer- 
tain jobs if their learning is unfavorable and 
reap the high expected rewards from jobs 
associated with favorable on-the-job experi- 
ences. This asymmetry generates a predilec- 
tion for loose priors. This aspect of adaptive 
behavior is the most distinctive prediction of 
the model, but it has never been the subject 
of an explicit empirical test. 
To analyze the effect of the hazard warn- 
ings on the level of compensating differen- 
tials, we first need some additional notation. 
Let Y represent initial worker income, X be 
a vector of all nonrisk variables for that job, 
Z be the unmeasured effects specific to the 
job-worker match, and u be the error term. 
The compensating differential results in Sec- 
tion I focused on an equation of the form 
(6) Y=13X+13*RISK+3**y + Z+ u. 
Since y and Z were omitted from the model, 
the estimated coefficients were subject to 
omitted variables bias. 
The situation following information (de- 
noted by postscript 1) can be modelled simi- 
larly, where 
(7) YJ = ,X + ,*RISKI 
+ f**(y + ()+ Z + ul. 
Subtracting equation 6 from equation 7 yields 
(8) Y1-Y=f*ARISK+?f**(+ul-u, 
where A RISK is RISK] - RISK. Equation 
(8) will yield consistent estimates of the 
coefficients in this fixed effects model as the 
sample size N -s o if there is sufficient varia- 
tion in ARISK and .`12 It should be noted 
that we do not have information on (i but 
12 Use of the fixed effects model in compensating 
differentials studies is not unprecedented. See Brown 
and, more generally, see Gary Chamberlain (1982). 
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TABLE 6-POST-INFORMATION EARNINGS AND QUIT EQUATIONSa 
Dependent RISK R2/-2 Log 
Variable or A RISK s ' Likelihood 
EARNG 9934.5 6784.2b 52 ob .24 
(5468.6) (3342.3) (32.2) 
AEARNG 12435.3 - 65.56b .17 
(2681.9) (20.10) 
EARNG 9838.3 6602.3c 41.6c .24 
(5471.3) (2684.2) (19.6) 
AEARNG 12777.5 - 46.53c ,17 
(2640.3) (14.17) 
LNEARNG .627 .456b .0021b .28 
(.303) (.185) (.0018) 
ALNEARNG .633 - 0027b .31 
(.087) (.0007) 
LNEARNG .622 .424c .001 8c .28 
(.303) (.149) (.0011) 
ALNEARNG .651 - .0019c .31 
(.086) (.0005) 
QUITA -1.05 5.95 .027b 381.3 
(2.03) (1.43) (.013b 
AQUITA 20.4 - .011 63.3 
(4.3) (.029) 
QUITA -1.07 5.75C .021c 384.6 
(2.02) (1.17) (.008) 
AQUITA 20.6 - .002c 63.5 
(4.3) (.020) 
aAll cross-sectional equations include other explanatory variables as in Tables 2 
and 3. 
b The 4 variable is based on the linear regression estimates reported in Table 5. 
CThe 4 variable is based on the log-odds regression estimates reported in Table 5. 
on i for each labeling group, which is i/y 
Workers, however, will differ in the precision 
of their priors, so that y will be a random 
variable. Since the workers were assigned 
randomly to each labeling group, the preci- 
sion variable should be subject to random 
measurement error, biasing the /3** coeffi- 
cient downward. 
Table 6 reports the earnings equations both 
in the first difference form (i.e., AEARNG, 
A LNEARNG) and in the cross-sectional form 
for the post-information case, where the 
RISK variable is of the samne form as the 
dependent variable (ARISK). Since the first 
differencing eliminates the biases from omit- 
ted fixed effects, the change in earnings equa- 
tions will be estimated for the full sample, 
while the cross-sectional results will focus on 
the BC/TECH subsample as before. In the 
case of the post-information cross section, 
we included both RISK and s rather than 
RISK] in order to estimate explicitly the 
role of the risk implied by the warning. The 
results reflect a consistent pattern of pre- 
miums for prior risks and risks communi- 
cated through the label. Similarly, labels 
associated with high relative precision I gen- 
erate additional premiums, as predicted. 
The consistency of worker behavior with 
the earlier results is more difficult to ascer- 
tain since premiums per unit of risk should 
be larger since individuals will demand higher 
rates of compensation if placed in a highly 
risky job that is not consistent with their 
preferences. Whereas the initially perceived 
risks are the result of a voluntary self-selec- 
tion process, the post-information risks are 
not, and serious mismatches may occur. 
Higher desired premiums per unit of risk 
consequently should be observed. 
The magnitude of the post-information 
wage-risk tradeoff bears out this pattern. In 
the case of the linear specifications, for ex- 
ample, the RISK and s coefficients average 
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about one-fifth higher than in Table 2, while 
in the first difference form A?RISK com- 
mands premiums three-fourths larger. A 
greater response is observed in the first dif- 
ferencing case because the additional desired 
premiums per unit of risk for the added 
hazard will be averaged only across the extra 
risks, whereas the post-information cross sec- 
tion obtains an average unit risk premium 
for the entire risk level. In addition, about 
one-third of the discrepency arises because 
the first differencing results focus on the full 
sample, which is wealthier than the BC/ 
TECH subsample used in the cross sectional 
results. These workers consequently demand 
a larger premium per unit risk.'3 
To analyze the change in workers' quit 
decisions, we can formulate a post-informa- 
tion cross section and an analogue of the 
fixed effects model for discrete variables.'4 
The post-information quit intentions in the 
cross-sectional results are driven exclusively 
by the implied risk and precision of the 
hazard, each of which has the expected posi- 
tive effect. The most dramatic difference with 
the earlier results is in the ARISK coeffi- 
cients in the first difference equations, which 
are almost three times larger than in the 
preinformation results in Table 3. Such a 
dramatic increase is not implausible since 
quits arising in the market are in response to 
a pay-risk package mix that the worker ini- 
tially accepted. Here workers are responding 
to often dramatic changes in their job's at- 
tractiveness so that the intensity of the re- 
sponse should increase. The AQUITA equa- 
tions do not, however, lead to significant 
coefficients for 'I, a result that may be due 
to the drop in sample size down to 161 as a 
consequence of the statistical estimation pro- 
cedure that has been used. 
IV. Conclusion 
The focus of this analysis has been on an 
adaptive framework in which individuals do 
not have perfect job risk information, but 
instead continually revise their risk judg- 
ments in Bayesian fashion and then switch 
jobs once these judgments become too un- 
favorable. This theory is an extension of the 
standard compensating differential analysis 
rather than an incompatible theory. Workers' 
initial perceptions of risk led to compensat- 
ing differentials and also generated inten- 
tions to quit and regret over having accepted 
the job initially. The evidence of risk-related 
job mismatches is consistent with a model of 
job experimentation and would not occur in 
a perfect information version of the com- 
pensating differential model. The extent of 
these mismatches does not, however, appear 
to be great, so that for this sample the market 
appears to operate reasonably effectively. 
After being given a hazard warning for use 
of a new chemical in their job, workers re- 
vised their risk assessments in the expected 
directions, but retained some influence of 
their prior for hazard warnings with low 
informational content. Although the risk level 
implied by the label was of consequence, 
differences in informational content ap- 
peared to be more influential in governing 
one's posterior risk assessment. This learning 
in turn generated a demand for risk pre- 
miums and incentives to quit, as predicted. 
Both the change in the level of the risk and 
changes in the precision of workers' judg- 
ments were of consequence, as the adaptive 
model predicts. Although the change in the 
risk level had a more consistent direct effect 
on behavior than did the relative precision of 
the hazard warning, the precision also has an 
indirect influence through its powerful im- 
pact on the posterior risk assessment. 
The pivotal influence of the informational 
content of the chemical label has broad 
ramifications for the design of effective risk 
information strategies. Past informational 
campaigns such as those intended to encour- 
'3Estimation of the EARNG and LNEARNG equa- 
tions for the BC/TECH subsample yielded annual risk 
premiums about $1,000 less than for the full sample. 
14 Using the procedure developed by Chamberlain 
(1980), we will restrict the sample to those individuals 
who altered their quit decisions since sample observa- 
tions involving the same quit responses provide no 
useful information for the estimation. Those (0,1) re- 
sponses who would quit after the warning but not before 
(primarily from LA C, TNT, and ASB groups) con- 
stitute one of the binary outcomes and the (1,0) re- 
sponses (primarily from CARB) constitute the other 
outcome. The explanatory variables are the first dif- 
ferences of the variables included in the pre-information 
equation so that only the risk-related variables remain. 
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age seatbelt use and deter cigarette smoking 
have generated disappointing results. The 
primary purpose of these efforts is that of 
exhortation rather than providing consumers 
with information that they did not already 
possess. The lack of a major consumer re- 
sponse should not be unexpected since the 
informational content of these warnings was 
low. The results in this study indicate that 
risk information programs will be most effec- 
tive when they do not simply convey the risk 
level, but they also provide individuals with 
new information in a convincing manner. 
Most workers behaved as expected, but 
there was a small minority of alarmist re- 
sponses as well as some inertia and incon- 
sistencies. Moreover, while the empirical evi- 
dence constitutes the most refined test of the 
Bayesian learning model of adaptive job 
choice, observed consistency with the prin- 
cipal predictions of the theory does not nec- 
essarily imply full rationality. Nevertheless, 
there is strong evidence of a systematic 
worker response that is quite different from 
the polar extremes of optimal decisions with 
perfect prior information and random deci- 
sions by irrational workers. 
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